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22 August 1955

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Organizational Proposal for the Production  
of Intelligence on International Communism

1. There appears to be general agreement that the output of finished intelligence on communism needs to be substantially increased. This need has been recognized and voiced from time to time for several years and restated recently in the USIA survey, an OCB paper concerning propaganda against communism, and other internally circulated CIA papers. In order that steps might be taken to provide for the desired increased output, the SA/PC/DCI was directed to examine the appropriate location of primary responsibility for the production of intelligence on international communism and to consult with the Special Assistant/Intelligence, Dept. of State, on this subject. After preliminary consideration of the referenced memorandum, the SA/PC/DCI was directed to develop specific recommendations concerning any desirable expansion of functions and new organizational arrangements within the CIA that might be required to meet the recognized need. This memorandum sets forth a recommended course of action in response to both of these requests.

2. The more important conclusions are that there are three distinguishable intelligence production activities all of which need to be initiated or expanded. They are:

a. The production of finished intelligence of a level of generality useful to policy makers, organized for the most part in the form of studies of institutions, situations, and developments in particular countries,

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including most contributions to NIEs and the NIS and much current intelligence;

b. The provision of operational intelligence in support of FI and CE activities and of specific and detailed information on communist organizations, communication nets and personalities, including much unclassified specific detail useable for propaganda and other PP purposes at home and abroad;

c. Continuing basic and operational research on, and speculative study of, communism and the means of countering communism.

CONCLUSIONS:

3. That the production of intelligence outlined in paragraph 2a should continue to be the responsibility of the Department of State inasmuch as there is no practical way to divide the subject matter of political and social intelligence as a whole, which is the responsibility of State, into two distinguishable subjects one of which is "Communism" and the other "everything else."

4. That the production of intelligence outlined in paragraph 2b above should be assigned to CIA (DDP).

5. That the activity outlined in paragraph 2c above (which is in part intelligence, in part estimation, and in part speculation on policy) should be carried on by several senior officers serving as a Senior Research and Planning Staff and attached administratively to the DSI.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

6. To implement the foregoing conclusions it is recommended:

a. That a sum on the order of \$200,000 be authorized for reimbursement to the Department of

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State for the production of NIS material along the lines of the outline of a country supplement and in an order of priority by country to be approved by CIA, the specific amount to be dependent upon the establishment of mutually agreed specifications and responsive to the needs of the community.

b. That to carry out its production responsibility, CIA enlarge [redacted]

DDP/CI either through the addition of personnel doing similar work obtained from other parts of DDP or/and the addition of new T.O. to carry out the second production activity, namely, the operational intelligence support. This staff should, of course, have access to operational material in the DDP area but should also make maximum use of intelligence produced in the Department of State and in the offices of the DDI as well as of overt intelligence. The [redacted]

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[redacted] should recognize clearly that its function is not only to provide intelligence support for the Clandestine Services but also to meet the needs of other components of the community for specific and detailed intelligence. In particular it should make every effort to sanitize its product to meet the needs of agencies such as [redacted] and the Defense Department.

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c. That several senior officers be assigned to devote themselves to the kind of work described in 2c above. They should be administratively assigned to the DDI, encouraged to develop mutually stimulating relations with the DDP/CI a [redacted]

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[redacted] with access to such information as would be relevant to their task. These research and planning officers should not have administrative responsibilities or the management of research programs. They should have the objectivity expected of intelligence officers and, while they should be accessible

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to operational personnel for consultation on operational problems, they should not become involved in operational responsibilities. They should have overt status in order to permit easy consultation with policy officers in other departments, with scholars and academic institutions, and with individuals and institutions of other countries.

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